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ABSTRACT 
  The major perspective of this paper is to provide more evidence regarding how “quickly”, in 
different macroeconomic states, companies adjust their capital structure to their leverage 
targets. This study extends the empirical research on the topic of capital structure by focusing 
on a quantile regression method to investigate the behavior of firm-specific characteristics 
and macroeconomic factors across all quantiles of distribution of leverage (book leverage and 
market leverage). Therefore, depending on a partial adjustment model, we find that the 
adjustment speed fluctuated in different stages of book versus market leverage. Furthermore, 
while macroeconomic states change, we detect clear differentiations of the contribution and 
the effects of the firm-specific and the macroeconomic variables between market leverage 
and book leverage debt ratios. Consequently, we deduce that across different macroeconomic 
states the nature and maturity of borrowing influence the persistence and endurance of the 
relation between determinants and borrowing.   
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INTRODUCTION 
  Plausible questions have been triggered in the scientific area of capital structure dynamic 
determination prompted by the recent global financial crisis, regarding how “quickly”, in 
different macroeconomic states, companies adjust their capital structure to their book 
leverage targets. In an effort to broaden the debate scope, we focus on SMEs and discuss the 
relative importance of macroeconomic and firm-specific variables, in changing 
macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, depending on a partial adjustment model, we obtain 
that book and market debt follow different patterns concerning their adjustment speeds. 
  A scientific area that has drawn research interest during the last two decades is capital 
structure determination of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the reason is partly the 
recognition of the importance of SMEs for the economy in terms of employment and value 
added as well as numbers of enterprises and partly the acknowledgement that SMEs financing 
exhibits considerable differences compared to large enterprises. Hence, during the last twenty 
years, a series of research has emerged which focuses on investigating the particularities of 
small enterprises in their capital structure determination. 
  Particularly, this issue is tackled in Torres and Julien (2005) research from a managerial 
perspective, where they describe the main findings of researchers over the last three decades, 
which have led to the recognition of SMEs specificities. Thus, in this wide recognition where 
research has shed light on the fact that large firms’ theory has limited applicability to SMEs, 
the theory of capital structure cannot be an exemption. Ang (1991) was the first that 
highlighted this approach by pointing out that the theory of finance was not developed with 
the small business in mind, whereas Cressy and Olofsson (1997) declare that small businesses 
are not scaled-down versions of large businesses and Michaelas et al. (1999) endeavors to 
relate the different theoretical attributes to small enterprises. 
  On the contrary, in his research Hackbarth et al. (2006) indicated that little attention has 
been paid to the macroeconomic conditions’ effects on capital structure choices and credit 
risk, notwithstanding the substantial development of the capital structure literature. Plausible 
questions have been triggered in the scientific area of capital structure determination by the 
recent global financial crisis regarding how quickly firms tend to adjust their capital structure 
in different economic states to their long-term targets. Furthermore, the research of Cook and 
Tang (2010) is built on the findings of previous analysts, such as Chloe et al. 1993; Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003, where macroeconomic conditions do affect 
companies’ financing choices, and denote that companies adjust their leverage toward target 
faster in good macroeconomic states compared to bad macroeconomic states. In their study, 
Oztekin and Flannery (2012) compare speed adjustments of capital structure across countries 
and prove that financial and legal conditions vary with debt adjustment speeds. 
Correspondingly, Baum et al. (2016) in his research follow a similar approach and indicate that 
companies with above-target leverage and financial surpluses adjust their leverage more 
rapidly when macroeconomic risk is high and firm-specific risk is low, whilst companies with 
below-target leverage and financial deficits adjust their capital structure more quickly when 
both types of risk are low. The context of Baum et al. (2016) triggers precisely the main idea 
of this paper, namely to investigate in changing macroeconomic states the relative 
significance of traditional firm-specific capital structure determinants, such as asset structure, 
size, profitability, risk and growth, versus macroeconomic variables.  
  Contributing to the interesting debate of the relative importance of firm-specific versus 
macroeconomic variables in changing macroeconomic conditions is the main research 
objective of this paper, seen respectively in a demand-driven context vs. supply-driven 
context, in the SMEs environment and none of the aforementioned studies simultaneously 
combine SMEs’ specificities with adjustment speed in capital structure determination or 
explore the issue of firm-specific vs. macroeconomic variables in different economic states. 
  Two periods of different macroeconomic states are identified, growth and recession, that 
mainly follow the methodological explanation of Cook and Tang (2010) and Oztekin and 
Flannery (2012), by using a dynamic model of partial adjustment capital structure with   
unobserved heterogeneity and fake variable for the macroeconomic states. We find that there 
are clear differentiations of the effects and the contribution of the firm-specific versus the 
macroeconomic variables between long-term and short-term debt ratios in changing 
macroeconomic states. From our results we reach a conclusion that the nature and maturity 
of borrowing across different macroeconomic states affects the endurance and persistence of 
the relation between determinants and borrowing. 
  Thus, our opinion is that this paper contributes on the recent dynamic determination of 
capital structure in the below ways. Firstly, we manage to broaden the scope of the debate by 
including SMEs, secondly, we show that macroeconomic states have a prevailing effect on 
how the relationships of capital structure determinants and leverage are shaped and finally 
we indicate that these relationships are also influenced by debt maturity. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
  Initially, we probe if our panel data model is a random or fixed effect model. This can be 
detected through Hausman (1978) test, which allows us to find that our model is a fixed effect 
model. Generally, panel data models provide us control of the implications of companies’ non-
observable individual effects on the estimated parameters. To the extent of our knowledge 
panel data are the most appropriate to examine a dynamic phenomenon which varies across 
time compared to cross-section or time series data that neither express dynamic relations. 
Moreover, panel data allow us to estimate raised accuracy since they use double observations 
which are used in both assessment with the cross section or time series data.  
 
THE MODEL 
Following the rationale of Cook and Tang (2010), Oztekin and Flannery (2012), Nikolaos 
Daskalakis, Dimitrios Balios and Violetta Dalla (2017), Antreas Kaloudis and Dimitrios Tsolis 
(2018), we use a partial adjustment model, which assumes that the target debt ratio LEV ∗i,t 
from firm  i at time t, is given by: 
LEVB ∗i,t= a ∗ +a ∗i+ β ∗ Xi,t + γ ∗ Mt,         i = 1, . . . . . . . , N,      t = 2, . . . . . , Ti 
LEVM ∗i,t= a ∗ +a ∗i+ β ∗ Xi,t + γ ∗ Mt,         i = 1, . . . . . . . , N,      t = 2, . . . . . , Ti 
 Where a ∗ is the constant term, a ∗i is the unobserved heterogeneity of firm i, X =
(X1, … . , XK)
′ and M = (M1, … , MJ)
′
are (column) vectors of firm specific and macroeconomic 
variables respectively, β ∗= (β ∗1, . . . , β ∗K) is the (row) coefficient vector of firm-specific 
variables and γ ∗= (γ ∗1, . . . , γ ∗j) the (row) coefficient of the macroeconomic variables. The 
debt ratio DRi,t adjust to its target according to the rule: 
DRi,t − DRi,t−1 = δ ∗ (DR ∗i,t− DRi,t−1) + εi,t 
LEVBi,t − LEVBi,t−1 = δ ∗ (LEVB ∗i,t− LEVBi,t−1) + εi,t 
LEVMi,t − LEVMi,t−1 = δ ∗ (LEVM ∗i,t− LEVMi,t−1) + εi,t 
 
 
Where δ ∗ is the speed of adjustment and εi,t is the error term. 
 
The Data  
  The data is collected from published financial statements of U.S. economy companies for 44 
years. We use a dataset of SME’s and MNC’s of United States economy. For the best of our 
knowledge panel data are the most appropriate to observe a dynamic phenomenon that 
variates cross time in comparison with cross-section and time series data which neither 
express dynamic relations nor produced estimates are highly accurate due to the 
multicollinearity existence. Furthermore, panel data provide us estimates of raised accuracy 
while they used more than the double number of total observations that is used in both 
assessment with the times series or cross section data 
 
The variables 
  PROXIES FOR LEVERAGE 
Book leverage is the ratio of book debt/total assets. 
Market leverage is the ratio of book debt  /  ( book debt + market equity ) 
 
 
Firm specific factors 
  LIQUIDITY (LIQTA) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, as used by Graham and 
Harvey (2001) and De Jong et al. (2008).  
 
  NDTS is the nondebt tax shields (tax shields excluding interest), as used by Titman 
and Wessels (1998), Barton et al. (1989), Prowse (1990) and Miguel and Pindado (2001), who 
found an inverse relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields;  
NDTSi,t = EBITi,t − IPi,t − (
Ti,t
T
), 
Where IPi,t is the interest payable, Ti,t is the income Tax, T is the corporate tax rate. 
 
  PROFITABILITY (PROFTA). In view of the pecking order theory, firm’s financing decisions 
follow in general a hierarchy, preferring debt over equity and internal over external financing 
(Michaelas et al., 1999, Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2008; Psillaki & Daskalakis, 2009). Thus, it is 
expected that profitability should be negatively related to debt and be measured as earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets 
  SIZE (SIZEAT), expected to be positively correlated with debt levels. Larger firms may be able 
to reduce the transaction costs associated with long-term debt issuance. Public corporate 
debt usually trades in large blocks relative to the size of an equity trade, and most issues are 
at least 100 million dollars in face value to provide liquidity. Marsh's (1982) survey concludes 
that large firms more often choose long-term debt while small firms choose short-term debt. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total sales. 
  GROWTH (GROWTHAT) and leverage relation can be either negative or positive, with GR 
being measured as the annual rate of change in sales. 
  INVESTMENTS (INVTA) In accordance with Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), where: Ii,t =
NPPEi,t − NPPEi,t−1 + Di,t, where NPPEi,t is the fixed assets and Di,t is a proxy for the 
depreciation. 
The market-to-book (MRBRATIO) ratio was used by Rajan and Zingales (1995), De Jong et al. 
(2008), Lemmon and Zender (2010) and Sinan (2010). 
 
Macroeconomic factors 
INFLATION 
  An extensively investigated macroeconomic factor is the inflation rate (INFL). However, 
contradictory evidence exists concerning the effect of inflation on capital structure. In the 
context of literature, Bastos et al., (2009) found no effect of inflation on leverage, while Frank 
& Goyal (2009) detected a positive relationship between market leverage and inflation, yet no 
relationship on book leverage. On the other hand, Hanousek & Shyamshur (2011) verified that 
inflation generally has a positive influence on leverage, this effect however turns unimportant 
for certain specifications of their model. INFL is referred to the annual rate of change of the 
CPI index.  
 
GDP_RATE 
  GDPgrowth indicates monetary conditions in general. Beck et al. (2008), De Jong et al. (2008), 
Chipeta & Mbululu (2013) and Muthama et al. (2013) discovered that firms that operate in a 
country with increased real GDP, have a higher level of economic wealth and therefore they 
tend to issue more debt than equity. On the other hand, Kayo & Kimura (2011) confirmed a 
negative relationship and argued that companies tend to generate higher net incomes and 
greater revenues during periods of peak economic activity. In view of this, the opportunity to 
finance further investments internally and not by issuing equity or debt is provided. 
 
  
THE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
The Quantile regression in Panel Data approach  
  Our approach is based on quantile regressions, which estimate the effect of explanatory 
variables on the dependent variable at different points of the dependent variable’s 
conditional distribution. Quantile regressions were originally presented as a ‘robust’ 
regression method which permits for estimation where the typical hypothesis of normality of 
the error term might not be strictly satisfied (Koenker and Bassett, 1978);  
  This method has also been used to estimate models with censoring (Powell, 1984, 1986; 
Buchinsky, 1994, 1995). 
  Recently, quantile regressions have been used simply to get evidence about points in the 
distribution of the dependent variable further than the conditional mean (Buchinsky, 1994, 
1995; Eide and Showalter, 1997). We use quantile regressions to observe whether the effects 
of factors Is differentiated across the ‘quantiles’ in the conditional distribution of dependent 
variable. As described by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the estimation is done by minimizing 
K
Min
R 
 
{ : t tt t y 

 
 |yt − xtβ|    +     ∑ (1 − θ)|yt − xtβ| t∈{t:yt<xtβ}  
where yt , is the dependent variable, xt is the k by 1 vector of explanatory variables, β is the 
coefficient  vector and Θ is the estimated quantile. The coefficient vector b will differ 
depending on the particular quantile being estimated. 
 
RESULTS 
  We choose to use the conditional quantile estimator over the OLS estimator which focuses 
only on the central tendency of the distribution and does not permit the possibility of 
differentiation of the explanatory variables impact for highly leveraged firms. An additional 
reason for choosing the conditional quantile estimator is that it provides us the possibility to 
observe the sign and probability fluctuations across quantiles, from the lower leveraged firms 
to the higher leveraged firms.  
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Table 1. Mean variables 
  
  Table 1 contains the timeless process of the mean value of the variables listed in descriptive 
statistics table. As can be seen, the profitability shows that the businesses are not stable and 
do not have the capacity, even before the crisis, to produce earnings on their spending. The 
negative average that appears from the beginning (1970) just shows the weaknesses and not 
the business expenditure audited. The book value leverage fluctuated at low levels from 1970 
to 1982 and 1983 to 2004 and the bottomed values noticed from 2005 to 2012. The variable 
LEVB NDTSTA GROWTHTAINVTTA PROFITABILITYTOTALASSETSSIZETOTALA SETS LIQTA MBRATIO
FYEAR  Mean
1970 0.139690 0.042600 0.059778 0.244027 -0.000260 0.132120 0.352779 1.535749
1971 0.141780 0.046729 0.101896 0.240493 0.004645 0.127837 0.313398 1.698977
1972 0.140992 0.062088 0.129515 0.242241 0.005716 0.117787 0.250915 1.678525
1973 0.143063 0.071237 0.076835 0.253919 0.015958 0.113954 0.344997 1.210098
1974 0.147631 0.024458 -0.011965 0.254273 -0.000533 -0.003149 0.949054 0.941828
1975 0.150708 0.039875 0.041785 0.239150 -0.025303 -0.027838 0.785016 1.066874
1976 0.147880 0.051400 -0.037588 0.236601 -0.033367 -0.093113 1.172402 1.148631
1977 0.150343 -0.037280 -0.240755 0.235098 -0.260143 -0.139904 1.182724 1.200959
1978 0.154564 -0.105562 0.053530 0.230952 -18.46424 -0.368005 1.124757 1.266096
1979 0.153878 0.053043 -0.249024 0.230988 -0.308044 -0.212858 1.305583 1.522321
1980 0.149778 -0.018428 0.046461 0.218302 -12.11516 -0.775996 1.396896 1.978820
1981 0.142240 -0.007546 -0.048861 0.208034 -16.18303 -0.667680 1.365316 1.706371
1982 0.144690 -0.070614 -0.065758 0.195780 -21.28464 -0.192868 1.604093 1.945591
1983 0.133584 -0.145602 -0.045320 0.186151 -64.82011 -1.426612 1.261924 3.917737
1984 0.134885 -0.151592 -0.429925 0.190624 -1.775894 -0.083775 1.320738 2.127915
1985 0.137273 -0.411265 -0.093992 0.179714 -220.3048 -0.405008 1.790088 2.496286
1986 0.137903 -0.245351 -0.829047 0.173315 -45.67793 -0.780753 1.648475 4.925750
1987 0.140365 -0.313044 -0.082686 0.170558 -2.311457 -0.620398 1.595128 2.793230
1988 0.142941 -0.090066 -0.338502 0.171510 -20.48788 -1.888683 1.098588 2.021181
1989 0.146296 -0.090016 -0.607975 0.167783 -13.52642 -2.112387 1.392790 2.036429
1990 0.143482 -0.456505 -1.964750 0.165067 -56.16537 -1.679670 1.031316 1.954070
1991 0.137889 0.061399 -0.900192 0.159298 -183.4780 -0.955596 1.306244 2.362401
1992 0.133088 -0.212463 -0.219172 0.156648 -16.69850 -1.242420 0.948451 2.367913
1993 0.128893 0.026244 -0.036134 0.152011 -85.29508 -1.080205 0.874290 2.345391
1994 0.129322 -0.183577 -0.036700 0.149810 -25.78515 -0.111067 0.766826 2.122566
1995 0.131387 -0.207771 0.046239 0.145471 -72.40709 -0.904528 0.585123 4.207664
1996 0.126173 -0.310088 -0.028548 0.139830 -34.82157 -0.208535 0.505412 4.230933
1997 0.129461 -0.198543 -0.328197 0.134392 -12.85966 -0.145216 0.506757 3.897723
1998 0.133354 -0.393308 -0.241248 0.125057 -28.11937 -0.300919 0.675374 3.914247
1999 0.133423 -0.661480 -0.240152 0.116419 -144.4903 -0.650102 1.108602 7.777139
2000 0.129199 -0.896225 -0.714099 0.113977 -166.5361 -2.813891 2.113655 11.63617
2001 0.130926 -2.153007 -2.235403 0.109943 -533.4581 -3.121916 2.117576 45.65303
2002 0.129775 -7.194115 -1.420282 0.108124 -3945.040 -2.407512 1.417264 18.78382
2003 0.127107 -2.157808 -0.554177 0.102899 -769.3364 -2.747282 1.372104 34.10847
2004 0.122018 -2.166352 -0.474094 0.100291 -757.6105 -2.226387 1.026367 25.38208
2005 0.119326 -1.673168 -3.844319 0.096758 -498.8867 -1.939739 0.941373 41.69120
2006 0.117370 -2.294531 -19.49168 0.095849 -560.5591 -0.620489 1.065100 12.20908
2007 0.117952 -19.96244 -0.675176 0.093070 -810.5068 -0.897278 1.147026 18.08759
2008 0.124018 -5.812493 -1.501465 0.096243 -431.6909 -1.263041 0.851625 26.51975
2009 0.119192 -1.953972 -0.306205 0.087959 -537.0656 -2.319693 1.425346 32.38875
2010 0.112245 -3.175418 -0.149307 0.087225 -506.5191 -1.897800 1.560945 33.37853
2011 0.114922 -3.032119 -0.651545 0.089214 -1296.340 -2.929817 1.318023 58.76859
2012 0.118043 -2.041775 -1.169095 0.082447 -533.9204 -4.136806 1.471296 62.41736
2013 0.122366 -3.860906 -1.184355 0.080221 -980.9264 -4.436785 1.711409 56.20476
2014 0.128992 -3.245300 -1.007030 0.080156 -459.4656 -2.251242 1.019701 44.83848
All 0.132945 -1.582786 0.149885 -339.4475 -1.218061 1.157826 15.33793
market-to-book ratio seems to reflect the true value of the business in the years 2001 to 2014. 
After 2005 the average price of the companies rises inexplicably, warning that the market 
value of a company is not its relative accounting value. The size and growth of US firms remain 
constant during all the years except 2012, which shows a negative trend from 1974 to 2014. 
The liquidity variable illustrates that the asset transactions do not affect the prices, which 
remain unaffected. According to the table, the variable investment is only affected by the 
crisis from 2005 until 2014. The tax shield non-interest seems to be used by US companies to 
reduce their taxes owed. This happens all over the years from 2001 to 2011. 
Table2.Correlation of variables 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 2 illustrates the correlation coefficients between the variables used in our model. The 
dependent and independent variables are provided with a Pearson correlation matrix. It is 
conspicuous that there is a non-statistically significant and negative correlation (r=-0.001821) 
between leverage in book values and non-debt tax shields. Similar findings were obtained by 
Frank & Goyal (2003). A statistically significant and positive correlation between leverage and 
investments at the 5% significance level, a statistically negative correlation (r=-0.0328) 
between leverage and liquidity at the 5% significance level (Pecking order theory), a 
statistically significant and negative correlation (r=-0.034814) between leverage and 
profitability at the 5% significance level. Pecking-order theory predicts a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage (accounting and market). This theory argues that 
companies will prefer to finance their needs first by using sustainable profits, then through 
Correlation
Probability LEVM LEVB NTDS_AT GROWTHAT INVTA PROFTA SIZEAT LIQTA MBRATIO INFLATION GDP_RATE_ 
LEVM 1.000000
----- 
LEVB 0.774976 1.000000
0.0000 ----- 
NTDS_AT 0.004957 -0.001813 1.000000
0.0233 0.4067 ----- 
GROWTHAT 0.001258 -0.016054 0.287029 1.000000
0.5648 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
INVTA 0.109086 0.002776 0.004726 0.003584 1.000000
0.0000 0.2039 0.0305 0.1009 ----- 
PROFTA 0.003712 -0.005120 0.701418 0.575486 0.005032 1.000000
0.0893 0.0191 0.0000 0.0000 0.0212 ----- 
SIZEAT 0.012493 0.007104 0.019446 -0.108386 0.017302 -0.000960 1.000000
0.0000 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6603 ----- 
LIQTA -0.033672 -0.034693 -0.000571 -0.004025 -0.023213 -0.001450 -0.024153 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.7939 0.0654 0.0000 0.5069 0.0000 ----- 
MBRATIO -0.019342 -0.002551 -0.527220 -0.307033 -0.015617 -0.378144 -0.364534 0.010543 1.000000
0.0000 0.2430 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ----- 
INFLATION 0.203700 0.079925 0.004534 0.001399 0.263124 0.002764 0.009036 0.004239 -0.013508 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0379 0.5220 0.0000 0.2057 0.0000 0.0523 0.0000 ----- 
GDP_RATE_ -0.022126 0.013480 0.006462 0.001301 0.059024 0.001688 0.005138 -0.000371 -0.008721 -0.145853 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.5515 0.0000 0.4397 0.0187 0.8653 0.0001 0.0000 ----- 
borrowing and then through the issuance of new shares. According to the Pecking-order 
theory, companies that are rapidly developing and have high funding needs will move on to 
short-term funding that is less subject to asymmetric information.  
  Furthermore, Pearson correlation provide us information for positive relation (r=0.0071) 
between leverage and size. This finding is in line with trade-off theory, that is, the bigger the 
business is, the greater the ability to borrow, and therefore it can have a higher leverage than 
a smaller company. According to Titman & Wessels (1988), the bigger the business-diversity, 
the shorter the probability of bankruptcy will be, and the less volatility is observed in its cash 
flows, so it can borrow to a larger extent from smaller companies. Finally, there is a statistically 
significant and negative correlation (r=-0.0161) between leverage and growth at the 5% 
significance level. Regarding trade-off theory, companies with high growth (investment) 
prospects must have low levels of borrowing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hausman Test 
  With the regression equation, we will choose the most catalyzed model between fixed 
effects and random effects and with the help of the Hausman test we will make the most 
appropriate choice for our model. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: RNDOM_LEVB   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 140.152192 7 0.0000 
     
     
 
H0 : Random effects model is appropriate 
H1 : Fixed effect model is appropriate. 
Probability of Chi-Sq < 0.05, so we reject null hypothesis, and Fixed Effect Model is the most 
appropriate for our model. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.  
 
 
  Assets structure variable (LAS) regarding total debt, enters with a positive sign (Bradley et al. 
(1984); Kaur& Rao (2009)) and finally shifts to a negative sign (Nguyen & Ramachandran 
(2006); Al- Ajmi et al. (2009); Karadeniz et al. (2009); Matzaz &Dusan (2009); Sheikh & Wang 
(2011)) from 0.6 quantile remaining statistically significant.  
  The fact that SIZE (SIZE) enters with an insignificantly negative coefficient and from 0.35 
quantile becomes significant with the same negative sign and rises since the 0.9 quantile of 
market leverage ratio, indicates that larger enterprises are less diversified and can be 
expected to bankrupt more often while smaller firms are usually opaquer well. At this point, 
larger firms can be expected for lower levels of leverage.  
  Growth (LGR), enters with a negative sign and from 0.35 quantile becomes positive until the 
0.9 quantile that is statistically significant for the total of quantiles. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities are more likely to exhaust internal funds and seek external financing.   
  Profitability (Lprof), appears with a negative sign that is non-statistically significant and from 
0.35 until 0.50 quantile the sign turns to negative and significant; a fact that indicates that 
higher total-leveraged firms in US, according to the Trade-off theory, are less profitable while 
less total-leveraged firms according Pecking order theory for financing decisions follow a 
preference for internal over external financing and for debt over equity.   
  Tax considerations are very noticeable for enterprises because of the reason that they can 
produce high profit. Non-debt-tax-shields enter with negative and non-significant sign and 
MARKET LEVERAGE
0,15 0,35 0,5 0,75 0,95
LIQUIDITY -0,0005 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
sterrors 0.0003 4.53E-05 4.95E-05 1.84E-05 1.62E-05
MBRATIO -5.59E-06 -1.38E-05*** -1.57E-05*** -1.76E-05*** -3.14E-05***
sterrors 5.03E-06 1.33E-06 8.72E-07 1.95E-06 4.77E-07
NDTS -5.16E-06 -1.16E-05*** -1.25E-05*** -3.00E-05 -5.11E-05***
sterrors 5.09E-06 1.37E-06 9.00E-07 0.0001 3.00E-06
PROFITABILITY -1.21E-08 -3.88E-08*** -4.89E-08*** -3.27E-08 -8.45E-09
sterrors 8.09E-09 2.76E-09 1.84E-09 3.61E-07 5.53E-09
SIZE -1.86E-06 -1.08E-05*** -9.76E-06*** -1.60E-05*** -2.83E-05***
sterrors 8.17E-06 2.31E-06 2.05E-06 3.00E-06 2.22E-06
GROWTH -1.68E-06 5.97E-06*** 9.62E-06*** 9.38E-06 2.65E-06***
sterrors 1.56E-06 1.61E-06 1.12E-06 6.61E-05 5.94E-07
INVESTMENTS -0.0083*** -0.0145*** -0.0031*** 0.0238*** 0.0676***
sterrors 0.0013 0.0014 0.0010 0.0016 0.0075
INFLATION 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0022*** 0.0025*** -0.0042***
sterrors 9.85E-05 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004
GDPRATE -0.0008*** -0.0026*** -0.0030*** -0.0047*** -0.0129***
sterrors 0.0001 8.77E-05 7.42E-05 0.0001 -0.012919
FIXED_EFFECTS 0.4395*** 0.8202*** 0.9920*** 1.2649*** 1.2701***
R-squared 11.1% 34.8% 44.6% 50.2% 42%
QUANTILES
remain negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the relative advantage of 
resorting to debt as a tax shield alternative to depreciation is lower for high levels of total 
leverage.   
  Liquidity remains negative and significant. Cash-rich companies expected to have lower debt 
and they prefer internal financing (Pecking order theory).  
  The fact that inflation (infl) starts with positive sign and from 0.95 quantile becomes negative, 
indicates that the high-leveraged firms are influenced from inflation in contrast to leveraged 
and less-leveraged firms, Frank and Goyal (2009).  
 
 
Table 4 
 
 
  Growth (LGR), enters with a positive sign and from 0.35 quantile becomes negative until the 
0.95 quantile and it is statistically significant for majority of quantiles. Firms with higher 
growth opportunities are more likely to seek external financing.   
  Profitability (Lprof), appears with a negative sign for 0.15 and 0.50 quantile and it is 
significant from 0.15 until 0.50 quantiles; this fact indicates that higher total-leveraged firms 
in US according to the Trade-off theory, are less profitable. Total-leveraged firms according to 
Pecking order theory, regarding their financing decisions follow a preference for internal over 
external financing and for debt over equity.   
BOOK LEVERAGE
0,15 0,35 0,5 0,75 0,95
LIQUIDITY -0.0008 -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001***
sterrors 0.0005 8.95E-05 3.73E-05 1.43E-05 8.03E-06
MBRATIO -1.92E-05*** -6.18E-06*** -4.17E-06*** -3.09E-06*** 0.0006
sterrors 5.37E-06 7.46E-07 3.90E-07 7.50E-07 0.0004
NDTS 3.94E-05*** -2.56E-06*** 3.62E-07 2.80E-06*** -0.0013
sterrors 1.40E-05 7.43E-07 4.29E-07 7.85E-07 0.0009
PROFITABILITY -8.13E-08*** 7.11E-09*** 2.71E-09*** -1.79E-09 2.87E-06
sterrors 2.83E-08 1.40E-09 9.67E-10 2.19E-09 1.83E-06
SIZE 1.48E-05*** 6.72E-06*** 1.05E-05*** 9.87E-06*** 8.58E-05***
sterrors 1.72E-06 1.48E-06 1.30E-06 2.39E-06 1.67E-05
GROWTH 2.61E-05 -4.37E-05*** -4.09E-05*** -3.89E-05*** -0.0023
sterrors 3.67E-05 8.80E-07 5.05E-07 5.37E-07 0.0443
INVESTMENTS -0.0089*** -0.0322*** -0.0303*** -0.0166*** -0.0582***
sterrors 0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 0.0010 0.0094
INFLATION 0.0024*** 0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0015*** -0.0068***
sterrors 8.60E-05 7.46E-05 4.23E-05 5.92E-05 0.0004
GDPRATE 0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0025***
sterrors 9.02E-05 7.26E-05 3.49E-05 6.50E-05 0.0003
FIXED_EFFECTS 0.5706*** 0.9224*** 1.0112*** 1.2272*** 1.3335***
R-squared 11.5% 38.5% 45.6% 44.2% 34.2%
QUANTILES
  Non-debt-tax-shields enters with positive and significant sign and remains negative and for 
0.35 and 0.95 is negative. This suggests that the relative advantage of resorting to debt as a 
tax shield alternative to depreciation is lower for median and high levels of leverage.   
  The inflation (infl) starts with a positive sign and from 0.50 quantile becomes negative, which 
indicates that the high-leveraged firms are influenced from inflation in contrast to leveraged 
and less-leveraged firms, Frank and Goyal (2009).  
  Liquidity remains with negative and significant sign. Cash-rich companies expected to have 
lower debt and they prefer internal financing (Pecking order theory).  
 
Table 5 
 
  QUANTILES 
  0.15 0.35 0.5 0.75 0.95 
SPEED MARKET 52.7% 59.7% 81.2% 74.2% 33.2% 
R-squared 43.6% 49.1% 63.6% 55.9% 20.8% 
SPEED BOOK 25.9% 49.3% 53.2% 44.4% 7.4% 
R-squared 13.7% 27.1% 29.4% 25.2% 4.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
  Inspired by the importance of understanding capital structure, this paper uses quantile 
regression approximations to add to empirical information and focuses on how capital 
structure relations fluctuate between firms at different stages of the total debt, short-terms 
debt and long-terms debt distribution. Our findings complement a new dimension to the 
knowledge of US firms’ financing behavior reported in existing literature suggesting that 
research on the relation between capital structure and incentives could benefit from 
knowledge of heterogeneity in the capital structure and from using quantile regression 
techniques in the field of corporate finance. Moreover, if firms maximize subject to an upper 
constraint on debt, the relationship between leverage and its determinants might change sign 
as leverage increases, and quantile regression enables us to identify such effects within 
sample. 
  The adjustment speed slows down for long-terms debt ratio, the adjustment speed slows 
down only in the first quantile and from the second quantile does not change. The adjustment 
speed for long-terms debt ratio does not affect during crisis and the total debt ratio slows 
down for most of the quantiles.  
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